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The Indonesian Incursion into Borneo
Greater Malaysia
Confrontation was a conflict which developed in 1963 between Indonesia
and the new
state of Malaysia backed by Commonwealth allies. Its origins lay in
Great Britain's
plans to divest itself of formal empire in South-east Asia. This would
be achieved
by federating the then Crown colonies in Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak),
the
protected state of Brunei, and the self-governing colony of Singapore
with Malaya,
which had been independent since 1957, and where the 12-year-long
Emergency
had formally ended in 1960. Formal agreement providing for a
federation of
greater Malaysia was reached between London and Kuala Lumpur in
November 1961.
Both parties agreed to establish the new state by 31 August 1963.
Despite
relinquishing sovereignty, the British were guaranteed the continued
use of their
bases at Singapore by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.
Indonesian opposition
These plans for a greater Malaysia were strongly opposed by
neighbouring
Indonesia and its charismatic president, Achmed Sukarno. He
complained, with
particular emphasis on the continued British military presence at
Singapore, that
London's grant of independence was not sincere. Sukarno reasoned that
Malaysia,
by virtue of its intended close relationship with Britain, would
become a British
satellite, ultimately serving to perpetuate, rather than end, European
domination of
the region. In addition, opposition to Malaysia conveniently
buttressed the President
politically, since engaging nationalist fervour against Britain
distracted Indonesian
public opinion from the appalling state of the nation's economy. It
came as no
surprise, therefore, when the Indonesian foreign minister, Dr
Subandrio, declared
on 20 January 1963 that Indonesia would henceforth pursue a policy of
Konfrontasi
(Confrontation) against Malaysia.
Guerilla warfare
Sukarno was limited in his options for opposing Malaysia. Although
equipped with
modern weapons from Moscow, the Indonesian armed forces were not
capable of
prevailing in an open engagement with the British. Instead, Sukarno
decided to
encourage and support subversive movements already existing in Borneo.
If allowed
to develop into a major insurgency, the British might eventually be
worn down into
abandoning the objective of greater Malaysia altogether. By the end of
1963, this
strategy increasingly involved Indonesian army regulars, posing as
guerrillas,
crossing the border from Kalimantan to attack the security forces in
Borneo and
then quickly retreating to the safety of Indonesian territory.
Areas of conflict during Confrontation, 1963-66.
British response: Operation Claret
The British responded to Confrontation in a two-pronged manner. In
order to deter
the Indonesians from mounting an open attack on Malaysia, substantial
air and naval
forces were deployed in and around Singapore. The main concern for
British military
planners throughout the conflict, however, was containing the
insurgency in Borneo.
Here the security forces were in an impossible situation. They were
required to
defend a frontier of approximately 1600 kilometres, in extremely dense
jungle and
against an enemy who could retreat to the safety of Indonesian
Kalimantan.
Increasingly frustrated, Major-General Sir Walter Walker, director of
operations
in Borneo, requested permission to pursue the guerrillas across the
border. After
considerable debate, London finally agreed in April 1964.
The objective of cross-border operations, code-named Claret, was to
wrest the
initiative from the enemy. Accordingly, starting in May that year,
predominantly
SAS troops, operating in groups of four, regularly patrolled territory
immediately
across the border. When a patrol discovered enemy guerrillas moving
towards
Borneo, it would arrange for them to be ambushed as they crossed the
border.
Britain requests support
This strategy, both regarding deterrence and military operations, was
remarkably
successful in containing the insurgency to a low level of conflict.
Nonetheless, it
required a considerable deployment of Britain's limited resources and
manpower. By
early 1965, for example, Britain had more than 60,000 servicemen
deployed in the
region, together with a surface fleet of more than eighty warships,
including two
aircraft-carriers. It was not surprising, therefore, that, starting in
December
1963, repeated requests were made by the British for New Zealand (and
Australia)
to send combat forces into Borneo to assist in containing the
insurgency.
New Zealand refuses to send troops
In responding to these requests the National administration led by K.J.
Holyoake
had to weigh carefully certain countervailing policy considerations.
On the one hand,
there was no disagreement that Malaysia should be supported. In both
official and
public eyes, Indonesia had committed clear and frequent acts of
aggression against
the new state. On the other hand, however, Wellington was eager to
avoid New
Zealand becoming embroiled in a major war with Indonesia.
Policy-makers realised
that, in the event of considerable bloodshed, New Zealand's relations
with its
closest Asian neighbour could be poisoned for generations to come.
Consequently,
the government initially refused to send troops into Borneo, arguing
that British
and Malaysian forces already stationed there were sufficient to deal
with the
problem.
Indonesian coup ends Confrontation
On 1 October 1965 a group of army officers made an unsuccessful
attempt to
seize power in Jakarta, but the uprising was ruthlessly crushed by
troops loyal to
Major-General Suharto. This event heralded a major transformation in
Indonesian
politics. Increasingly, Sukarno became a paper President, with real
power being
exercised by Suharto and the army establishment. These generals,
concerned with
restoring economic stability and suppressing the Indonesian communist
party, were
determined quietly to abandon Sukarno's radical agenda, particularly
the
Confrontation.
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